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THE ELUSIVE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL'
TERMINATION OF AUTOMOBILE DEALERSHIP FRANCHISES
American Motors Sales Corporation was recently found liable for $20,000
in damages sustained by a small Rambler dealer as a result of American's
wrongful non-renewal of its franchise. While the case, Garvn v. Alncrican
Motors Sales Corp.,' has been reversed, it is significant as the first and only
reported case in which a court has been faced with the problem of formulating
a measure of damages under the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act of 1956.D
From the beginning, aside from all problems of remedies, the act has been
an enigma to courts and commentators. While it speaks generally of a duty
on the part of manufacturers to act in "good faith" in performing, terminating
or not renewing franchises, "good faith" is vaguely and restrictively defined
as "the duty ... to act in a fair and equitable manner... so as to guarantee
[the dealer] . . . freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats of coercion
or intimidation . . ... " The Minan bbject of this Note will be to assess the
1. 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 318 F2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963).
2. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1958).
Plaintiffs have been awarded verdicts in three other cases under the act. All but one
of these have been set aside or reversed on appeal. In Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1962), a lower court judgment in favor of plaintiff dealer
was reversed; no consideration was given to lost future profits. In Milos v. Ford Motor
Co., 206 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 896 (1963), thi district court upset a jury verdict of $95,000. No record of its
handling of the problem of lost future profits is available, but the plaintiff conceded that
lost future profits were recoverable only from the date of termination to the date at which
the franchise would, by its'terms, have expired. In Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp., Civ. No. 60-502, W.D. Pa., June 7, 1962, the court upheld a jury verdict
awarding the plaintiff dealer $35,000. Plaintiff held a franchise from defendant, and alleged
that in order to drive it out of business the defendant had discriminated, against It in
allotting Studebakers.
The National Automobile Dealers Association reports that in a fourth case under the
act (Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Willys Motors, E.D. Ky., 1960), a dealer received Judg-
ment on a jury verdict for $8,800. NATIONAL AUTOMOBIL DEALJns ASSOCIATION, A
STATUS REPORT ON SUITS UNDER THE AUTOMOBiLE DEALE s "GOOD FAITH" AcT 9
(1962). The association also reports that at least eight dealers have received out-of-court
settlements, some for substantial amounts, of their claims under the act. Id. at 8-10;
NATIONAL AuTomOIxnz DEALERS AssocATIoN, SUPPLEMENT TO STATUS REPORT ON
"GooD FATH" ACT 9 (1962).
3. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1958).
The key section of the act provides, in part, as follows:
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer ..
in any district court of the United States... and shall recover the damages by him
sustained and the cost of suit by reason of the failure of said automobile manufac-
turer from and after August 8, 1956 to act in good faith in performing or complying
with any of the terms or conditions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling,
or not renewing the franchise with said dealer: Provided, That in any such uilt the
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validity of Garvin's approach to the specific problem of damages in cases of
terminations or non-renewals permitted under franchise agreements, but
wrongful under the act.4 To this end, it is essential first to sketch the policy
of the act and the problems of its substantive interpretation.
Prior to the act, franchise agreements were of short duration and were
terminable at will upon notice.5 Franchises were enforced according to their
terms, and the manufacturer's right not to renew or to terminate was not
conditioned upon a duty to act in good faith.6 Restrained only by the desira-
bility of maintaining good dealer relations, manufacturers were in an enviable
manufacturer shall not be barred from asserting in defense of any such action the
failure of the dealer to act in good faith.
70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958).
The subsection defining "good faith" reads:
The term "good faith" shall mean the duty of each party to any franchise, and
all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner to-
ward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimida-
tion, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided, That
recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not
be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.
70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1958).
4. A termination may constitute a breach of the franchise agreement and entitle the
dealer to damages regardless of the act. For purposes of this Note, however, whenever
the lawfulness of a particular or hypothetical future termination or non-renewal is con-
sidered, it is assumed that the termination or non-renevral was or would be lawful under
the franchise.
The act prohibits bad faith "in performing or complying with" as well as "in terminat-
ing, canceling, or not renewing" a franchise. See note 3 supra. It is not certain how the
"performing or complying with" provisions will be interpreted. It would seem, however,
that the act might authorize recovery by a dealer in two kinds of situations: (1) vhere
the manufacturer has caused loss to the dealer (e.g., has allotted him an unfavorable selec-
tion of automobile) because of the dealer's refusal to comply with a coercive demand
(see note 19 infra), and (2) where the manufacturer has made a coercive demand and the
dealer has sustained loss as a result of his forced compliance. This Note is not concerned
with the problem of damages in either of these situations.
5. Early franchise agreements provided that the manufacturer might terminate for
"cause' or if it were not "satisfied" with the dealer's performance. Courts generally held
that manufacturers could not terminate arbitrarily or in bad faith under such agreements.
See, e.g, Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co, 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912). This led
manufacturers to adopt franchises which were terminable at will upon short notice. Courts
held that a manufacturer's right to terminate under such franchises vas absolute. See,
e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
The introduction of short term franchises appears to have been a response to state legis-
lation imposing restrictions on manufacturers' power to terminate but not upon their power
not to renew. See BusnxEss RELATioS IzsTrru, Auzosonn a DELER FPAsacmsz-
AaREEmmms im FAC ORY-DEALER RELATioNS 23 (1948). For a more detailed discussion
of the evolution of the franchise agreement in these respects, see Comment, The Auto-
mobile Dealer Franchise Act: A "New Departure" in Federal Legislationf, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 253-57 (1957) ; and Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by
Contract, 66 YA.LE L.J. 1135, 1145-47 (1957).
6. See, e.g, Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., .supra note 5.
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position. Dealers had substantial investments in their businesses ;7 since these
investments were not readily convertible, termination was tantamount to
"an economic death sentence."" Armed with the power to terminate, manu-
facturers were in a position to assert absolute control over dealers' operations,
Although many states had passed legislation designed to ameliorate this power
imbalance,9 the effort had proved ineffective.10 Complaining that manufacturers
were unfairly forcing them to buy unwanted cars and accessories and to make
7. When the act was passed the average dealer had an investment of $118,000 In his
business. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956).
8. Kessler, supra note 5, at 1188.
9. Nineteen states had enacted such legislation prior to the federal act. E.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 320.60-.70 (1958); N.Y. GEN. BUs. LAW §§ 196-98 (1957). In
two states similar legislation was declared unconstitutional. See Rebsamen Motor Co. v,
Phillips, 226 Ark. 146, 289 S.W.2d 170 (1956) ; and General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144
F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956).
Most of the state statutes go considerably farther than the federal act. As a rule, they
do not require that a termination be accompanied by coercion to be unlawful. Typically,
they prohibit any termination made "without due regard to the equities of a . . .dealer"
- FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 320.64(8) (1958) - or "without just, reasonable, and law-
ful cause" - IOWA CoDE ANN. § 322.3(5) (1949). The state statutes also often regulate
conduct during the contractual period. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 218.01(3) (a) (15-16)
(1957); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 168.27(14) (4) (1960); Wyo. STAT. § 40-39 (1959).
All of the state statutes are in the form of licensing legislation. Generally, they provide
only that violation justifies imposition of a criminal penalty and refusal or revocation of a
license to do business in the state. Unless they are interpreted to afford dealers a private
right of action (see note 10 infra), they may not give dealers as much protection as they
purport to give them.
10. Surprisingly, there has been little litigation under the state statutes. This may be
because only Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-546-547 (1958) - has made explicit
provision for a private cause of action, or because only eight of the statutes specifically
cover instances in which a manufacturer fails to renew a franchise. Manufacturers may
have discouraged litigation by not renewing rather than terminating franchises.
The Wisconsin and Minnesota statutes, however, have been interpreted to afford deal-
ers a private right of action. In Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis, 488, 71
N.W.2d 420 (1955); Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp,
469 (D. Minn. 1956). These courts found franchise provisions invalid as against public
policy, which enabled them to hold that any wrongful termination was a breach of cost-
tract entitling the dealer to appropriate relief. Most of the other statutes, it would seem,
are capable of a similar interpretation. Similarly, it is possible that courts will interpret
those statutes which prohibit unfair "terminations" or "cancellations" to cover non-
renewals as well. But see Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169
F. Supp. 378, 381 (D.N.J. 1959).
Interestingly, the state statutes may figure significantly in litigation under the federal
statute. It is believed that the federal statute will be interpreted to make unlawful a
termination which is predicated upon the dealer's refusal to comply with an unlawful
demand or with a demand that he do something not required by the franchise agreement.
In jurisdictions which prohibit manufacturers from making certain kinds of demands (e.g.,
that the dealer construct a certain type of building), therefore, terminations as a result of
dealers' refusals to comply with such demands may violate the federal statute notwith-
standing the fact that the act demanded was required under the franchise agreement (as
unmodified by state law).
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uneconomic expenditures, dealers mounted a well-organized campaign in Con-
gress for corrective legislation."
The measure which eventually became the Automobile Dealers Franchise
Act was one of twenty pro-dealer bills before Congress in 1956 as a result of
this campaign.' 2 As first passed by the Senate, it was sweeping in effect. "Good
faith" was required of the manufacturer "in performing or complying with
any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or
not renewing the franchise,"' 3 and was defined as "the duty ... to act in a
fair, equitable, and nonarbitrary manner so as to guarantee [the dealer] ...
freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation,
so as to preserve all equities of [the dealer] ... which are inherent in the vature
of the relation created between such parties by the franchise."'4 Fearing an in-
terpretation which would require manufacturers to be mindful of dealers' profits
in setting production schedules, creating new dealerships, and experimenting
with new methods of distribution, all to the possible detriment of competition,
the Department of Justice objected vehemently to the italicized language.'8 To
meet these and other objections, the bill was amended in the House to exclude
the italicized language, to exclude the word "nonarbitrary,"'1 and to include
a section disclaiming an intent to "repeal, modify, or supercede directly or
indirectly any provision of the antitrust laws of the United States."'1
As passed with these amendments, the act was still capable of an interpreta-
tion allowing recovery by any dealer whose franchise was unfairly or inequitably
terminated.' 8 Such an interpretation, however, was made improbable by the
11. For a history of this campaign see Kessler, supra note 5, at 1171-73. Economic
difficulties were at the heart of the dealer's discontent. Between 1951 and 1954, dealer
mortalities as reported by Dun & Bradstreet had more than quadrupled and dealers' profits
on sales as reported by the National Automobile Dealers Association had dropped nearly
ninefold. Sutcom=annuF ON AtrrosroBmE MARIMTING PRA~rxc s oF THE SENATE COM-
miTT'EE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CommERnc, INTERI REPORT 4 (Comm. Print 1955).
The dealers pressed many specific complaints, and several bills were introduced to deal
with these (see note 12 infra), but the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act dealt only with
the more general problem of the imbalance of power between dealers and manufacturers.
12. See Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomnittee of the House Comnittee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, 64 (1956); McHugh, The Automobile Dealer
Franchise Act of 1956, 2 ANTrIRusr BuLTL 353 (1957). For a discussion of the general
nature of these bills, see Kessler, supra note 5, at 1172-73.
13. Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Comumititee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, 2 (1956).
14. Id. at 2, 242 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 128-30, 132-34, 246-75.
16. The reason. for the deletion of the word "nonarbitrary" is obscure. The matter
was only once mentioned during the hearings. See id. at 20. See also H.IL RER. No. 2350,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). While retention of the word might have rendered the act
capable of an interpretation prohibiting arbitrary termination or non-renewals, this would
not have come under any of the Justice Department's specifid objections to the bill.
17. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1224 (1958).
18. The Act defines "good faith" as "the duty... to act in a fair and equitable
manner ... so as to guarantee [the dealer] ... freedom from coercion, intimidation, or
19641
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act's legislative history and was quicidy rejected by the courts. It is now clear
that to be wrongful under the act a termination must be inconsistent with the
manufacturer's duty to guarantee the dealer freedom from coercion and in-
timidation.19 A termination can be inconsistent with such a duty only if it
threats of coercion or intimidation." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1958).
Professor Corbin, arguing that the "so as" clause is merely purposive and does not qualify
the words "fair and equitable," interprets the act to allow recovery by dealers in cases of
unfair termination. 6 ConBiN, CONT'ACTS § 1266, at 59-62 & n.73,5 (1962). Professor
Kessler first adopted this interpretation, arguing that the "so as" clause merely illustrates
and does not define conduct which is not "fair and equitable," then rejected it. Conpare
Kessler, supra note 5, at 1183-84, with Kessler & Stern, Compctition, Contract, and Vcr-
tical Integration, 69 YAL.E L.J. 1, 109 nA89 (1959). Corbin's interpretation has been
accepted by at least one court. See Barney Motor Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp,
172, 174 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (dictum). Cf. Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp,,
Civ. No. 60-502, W.D. Pa., June 7, 1962. The great majority of courts, however, have
rejected it. See note 19 infra.
Proponents of this interpretation have argued that an interpretation under which coer-
don or intimidation is a prerequisite of bad faith would render meaningless the act's
provision making the failure of a dealer to act in good faith a defense against its claim
for damages. See 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958). While it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which a dealer could "coerce" or "intimidate" a manufacturer within
the meaning of the act, one should hesitate to place too much emphasis on this incongruity.
It appears affirmatively that the defense was included as an inexpensive way to overcome
objections to the act's lack of "mutuality" of obligations imposed upon' dealers and mianu-
facturers. See Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 253 (1957). The legislative history shows al-
most conclusively that the "so as" clause was meant to qualify the words "fair and equi-
table." See H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956) ("The term 'fair and equi-
table' as used in the bill is qualified by the term 'so as .... '); 102 CoNG. R c. 14070
(daily ed. July 23, 1956).
19. See, e.g., Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 318 F,2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963);
Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
887, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
Initial drafts of the act would not have qualified the manufacturer's obligation to
guarantee dealers freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats of coercion or intimida-
tion. During the hearings in the House, however, manufacturers expressed concern that
they would be foreclosed by the act from making suggestions and recommendations to
dealers. Seer e.g., Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
omthe Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, at 566 (1956) (statement of Chrysler Corp,).
To safeguard manufacturers in this respect, a proviso was included in the act "that rec-
ommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not be deemed
to.constitute a lack of good faith." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(c) (1958);
see 102 CONG. REc. 14073-74 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Keating). Cf. Note, 25 GEO. WASU.
L. REv. 667, 680 (1957).
The meaning of "coercion" and "intimidation" in this context has been the subject of
considerable speculation. Coercion as defined by Webster is the "use of physical or moral
force to compel to act or assent." WFxsra's S Tnnr Nniv INTERATIONAL DICTIONtARy
439 (Merriam ed. 1961). It differs from intimidation in that the latter suggests "the act
of making timid or fearful or inspiring or affecting with fear." Id. at 1184.
Conventional definitions, however, do not resolve the problem. It is customary in the
automobile business for manufacturers to assume an active role in dealership management,
Franchise agreements require dealers to submit detailed financial statements at regular
intervals and manufacturer approval of most major dealership decisions. Factory repre-
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results from the dealer's failure to do an act the manufacturer has attempted
to coerce or to intimidate the dealer into doing.-0 On the other hand, where
the act demanded of the dealer is required by an uncoerced and reasonable
provision of the franchise, or where the dealer is, at the time of termination, in
breach of suc'a provision the termination will not be found wrongful.2 1 The
extent to which manufacturers will be allowed to rely upon the dealer's non-
performance- of -other franchise terms, however,- has yet to be determined.
Dealers have argued that the non-performance. relied upon must relate to a
franchise provision which is reasonable and which -was not procured by coercion
or intimidation.s While courts have-thus far avoided consideration of this
arguinent,2 the legislative history of the act seems to militate against its adop-
sentatives visit dealers frequently and keep a watchful- eye upon such things as inventory
'levels and capital requirements. When a dealer's sales fall below estimates based upon
local or regional averages, the manufacturer will generally suggest vrays to increase sales.
It would-seem that it is not coercion or intimidation for a manufacturer to make a sug-
giition and to promise special benefits if the dealer accedes to it. Several courts have held
that it is not coercion or intimidation'for a manufacturer to demand that a dealer do an
act which it-is required to do uinder tlie franchise agreement E.g., Milos v. Ford Motor
Co., 317 F.2d 712,-717-18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963) ; Augusta Rambler
Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp,, 213 -F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ga. 1963) ; cf. Gar-
vin v. American, Motors Sales Corp., 318 F2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1963). It has been main-
tained that an act or course of conduct does not constitute coercion or intimidation unless
it is wrongfil in the sense of being tortious, criminal or violative of a contractual or moral
duty'without regard to the-act. Kessler & Ster4 .supra note 18, at 106 n.478. Cf. RzsArs-
imET, CoNTRAcrs § 492 (1932) (definition of duress).
20: .A termination or non-Tenewal could not, by itself, constitute coercion or intimida-
tion. A coercive or intimidatory act necessarily looks "toward procuring performance of
a desired act or the assumptioi-of a desired, attitude." Note, 25 GEo. NVAsu. L. P=n. 667,
681 (1957). -
21. Courts have taken three approaches to this problem: one has been to interpret the
statutory terms "coercion" and "intimidation' to exclude a termination or non-renewal
based -updn a dealer's failure to comply with a demand that it perform an act required
by the7franchisie'See note 19 supra and -authorities cited thereinm A second approach has
been" to interpret the act so as to limit its prohibition to coercion and intimidation which,
objectively considered, is not "fair'and equitable." See, e.g., Woodward v. General Motors
Corp.; 298 F.2d- 121, 123, 128 (5th Cir.), cert: denied, 369 U.S. 887, rehearing denied, 370
U.S. 965'(1962). A third approach, less rooted in-any particular interpretation of the act,
has been to allow manufacturers a summary judgment or directed verdict where it appears
that the dealer-was in-breach of its franchise at the time of termination or non-renewal.
See, e.g., Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
-" -22:-' See; e.g., Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. 'American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp.
378 F(D.N.J. 1959) ; Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960) ; Milos
v. Fdrd -Mtor Co., 206 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
-23. No court, with the possible exception of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in -Woodward v. Genetal Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
-U.S. 887, rehearing" denied, 370 U.S. -965- (1962), has come out flatly and held that the
dealer's non-performance of any -valid'and material franchise term will exculpate the manu-
facturer. Courts have avoided tls igsue by finding in each case that the franchise term
relied upon by the manufacturer was "reasonable" as well ag valid and material. See cases
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion.24 Probably, therefore, manufacturers will be able to rely upon non-per-
formance of any term which is found valid under state law. The primary effect
of the act, thus, should be to eliminate the manufacturer's leverage, possessed
by reason of its contractual rights to terminate or not renew, to force dealers
to perform acts the manufacturer does not wish to or cannot require of them
by contract.
While the act seems to impinge upon the manufacturer's freedom of action
in terminating dealerships only in the case of coercive demands not sanctioned
by the franchise agreement, in operation the effect of the act upon the manu-
facturer may be more restrictive. Much pro-dealer state legislation prohibits
specific practices thought unfair to dealers, whether or not incorporated into
the franchise agreement ;25 similarly, franchise clauses may be invalidated tinder
general state law notions of unconscionability, adhesion, waiver, or estoppel.20
In either case a manufacturer's reliance upon these terms in the contract will
be misplaced, and the manufacturer will lose his defense that the termination
was permissible since the dealer was in breach of contract. A second limiting
factor on the manufacturer's freedom to terminate franchises is the juridical
risk that a court will mistakenly characterize an arbitrary termination per-
missible under the franchise agreement and state law as coercive, thus rendering
the manufacturer liable under the act. To avoid this risk a manufacturer might
cited note 22 supra; Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600
(E.D. Mich. 1962); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F,2d 645
(3d Cir. 1964).
24. It is only with regard to the written terms of a subsisting franchise agreement
that the act obligates manufacturers to act in good faith. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1221(b) (1958) ; see Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Corn.
inittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, at 246, 264-65, 274 (1956). And
the act does not extend protection to the dealer ir the making of the contract, See id. nt
238-41, 245.
While a conclusion that the act does not cover coercion or intimidation in the makling
of a franchise agreement means that a dealer may not rely upon the act to challetnge the
validity of a franchise term, it does not establish that it is "fair and equitable" or not
"coercive or intimidatory" for a manufacturer to demand that the dealer comply with
such a term. It suggests, however, as does the action of the House in excluding the
"equities" language contained in the definition of "good faith" first passed by the Senate
(see text at note 14 supra), that it was not Congress' intent to empower courts to dis-
criminate among franchise terms on vague grounds such as "fairness" or "reasonableness."
But see Note, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 667, 682-83 (1957) (franchise provision must be
reasonable) ; Comment, The Automobile Dealers Franchise Act of 1956 - An Evaluation,
48 CORNELL L.Q. 711, 723 & n.107 (1963) (franchise term must be fair; courts in umeasur-
ing dealer's performance should not confine themselves to criteria set up in the franchise),
Judicial rejection of a requirement of fairness and reasonableness would not neces-
sarily work a hardship on dealers or lessen the effectiveness of the act, since traditional
doctrines of adhesion or unconscionability (in cases involving unduly burdensome terms)
and waiver or estoppel (in cases of discriminatory action) could be employed for the same
ends. But see Alfieri v. Willys Motors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Globe
Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1964).
25. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
26. See note 24 supra.
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try to avoid all appearances of unexplained or unfair behavior. But in so doing
he must be careful to avoid making demands on the dealer, for such demands
might easily lead to a finding of coercion.
Although the substantive provisions of the act may place the manufacturer
who terminates or fails to renew a franchise - even if the termination is
arbitrary - in jeopardy of an adverse finding on the merits, the problems
associated with formulating a remedy once a violation has been found may
shift the risk of loss of the suit back to the dealer. Since the act speaks in
terms of "damages... sustained.., by reason of the.. . 2 7 wrongful termi-
nation, and since the manufacturer's liability arises out of a contractual rela-
tionship with the dealer, the most obvious remedy would be a monetary recov-
ery based on contract measures of damages - either an expectation interest
measured by loss of profits or by the difference in the market value of the
dealership before and after termination or a reliance formula reimbursing the
dealer for his past non-recoverable expenditures. Upon close examination,
however, each of these possible monetary remedies has its pitfalls. The lost
profits recovery is complicated not only by the usual problems of foreseeability
and certainty,28 but also by the problem of determining the period of time
over which loss of profits may be casually related to the termination.^ The
reliance remedy, which fails to provide a comprehensive solution since in many
cases the dealer will not have made substantial expenditures in reliance, is
complicated by similar evidentiary problems.30 And while the market value
before and after recovery seems relatively uncomplicated, it may result in re-
coveries which would not reflect the full extent of a dealer's expectation loss.31
One ready alternative to damages is injunctive relief, a remedy not entailing
the complicated issues of proof necessitated by the monetary formulas. Indeed,
one court has implied that injunctive relief is available to a dealer who is a
victim of a termination wrongful under the acL32 The injunctive remedy, how-
ever, is not entirely free from difficulty. Would an injunction 'bar only coercive
terminations or non-renewals or would it operate, in effect, to bar future non-
coercive terminations as well? If the latter, how long would the injunction
run; would it preclude the manufacturer from ever terminating an inefficient
or uneconomic dealership? What provision would be made for supervision
27. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958).
28. In the breach of contract context, it is standard doctrine that lost profits are
recoverable only if their loss is proven with reasonable certainty and was foreseeable at
the time of the formation of the contract. See, e.g., RESTTMENT, CONTRAcTs §§ 330-31
(1932). On the certainty problem under the act, see notes 55-62 infra and accompanying
text
29. See notes 51-54 infra and accompanying text.
30. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
31. See note 86 inlra and accompanying text.
32. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962) ; see also Sam Goldfarb
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1962). Both cases in-
volved motions for preliminary injunctions which were ultimately denied. The court's
reasoning in Bateman, however, would support the granting of a final injunction.
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by the court to insure that the manufacturer would not discriminate against
the dealer in such matters as the allotment of new cars ?33 Even assuming that
an injunction could be properly framed, the act still speaks of a dealer recover-
ing "the damages by him sustained .. .,"4 and this language implies that, at
the very least, a dealer should have the option of suing for damages caused
by a wrongful termination.
In order to construct an appropriate measure of damages for the act, the
policies underlying the law of damages should first be examined. The standard
measure of recovery in contract actions is the expectation interest - to put
the promisee in as good a financial position as he would have occupied had
the promisor fully performed.3 5 But significant limitations are often placed
upon this theoretical formulation. The doctrines of foreseeability and certainty
may be conceptualized as limiting the amount of recovery in order to make
contract breaching possible and to encourage future contract making.30 The
requirement of certainty may also serve a second function, that of limiting
a jury's discretion and permitting supervision by the court over the amount
of the recovery.3 7 The law of contract damages, thus, represents a balance
between a policy of full compensation on an individualized basis and an opposing
concern for standardized and limited formulas of recovery which will not make
contract breaching too expensive.38 This tension in damage policies may be
transposed to the context of the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act. As drafted,
the act seems to contemplate a full expectation recovery by the wronged dealer.
Such a recovery, moreover, would accomplish the apparent policy of the act
to deter coercion and intimidation. On the other hand, while large recoveries
probably won't cause the abandonment of the franchise system, 0 they may
have the effect of preventing termination of uneconomic or inefficient dealer-
ships. This wedding of the manufacturer to his current dealers may be aggra-
vated to the extent that the juridical risk of a manufacturer being mistakenly
33. Certain of the state statutes provide for injunctive relief. See notes 9-10 supra.
In at least one state case a final injunction, has been granted. Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). No information. has been secured con-
cerning how the court resolved problems of formulation and supervision there.
34. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958).
35. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Danages, 46 YALF LJ.
52 (1936).
36. See Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in, the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUst. L. Ruv. 731,
739 (1943).
37. See note 62 infra.
38. Compare Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), upith Bush.
wick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d. 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
39. There are several references in the act's legislative history to the possibility that
the act might prompt manufacturers to give up the franchise system of distribution. See,
e.g., Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Coninittee on the Judi-
ciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, 438 (1956). There have been reports that the Ford
Motor Company has recently bought out several dealer outlets. It is probable, however,
considering the success of manufacturers under the act, that this development has no re-
lation to the passage of the act.
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found in violation of the act materializes. Thus any formulation of damages
under the act should try to strike a balance between these competing policies,
although not necessarily the same balance that has been adopted in standard
contract actions.
In Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp.,4 0 the district court approached
the problem of damages under the act by seeking to ascertain the profits lost
to the dealer as a result of the manufacturer's failure to renew the dealer's
franchise.4 ' The court held that the dealer was entitled to recover all the profits
he would have earned over the period that the franchise would, "in the normal
course of events," have continued in effect. 4 To determine this period, the
court suggested that the jury consider the dealer's "habits," his "attitude to-
ward life," his "previous health," "the possibility he might die a natural
death. 4 3 The only evidence touching on any of these considerations was that
the dealer was 60 years old and had a life e-x-pectancy, as shown by mortality
tables, of 15.9 years" Although the court implied that it would have been
40. 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963).
41. The court implied that the dealer might recover, in addition to lost profits, (1)
$4,000 for parts and $7,000 for equipment rendered valueless by the non-renevral, (2)
$10,000 for good will lost as a consequence of the non-renewal, and (3) $1,500 for rent
payable on the unexpired term of his lease. Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202
F. Supp. 667, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1962), revd, 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963). Since the evidence
-would have supported a recovery of no more than $18,000 lost profits for one year, the
jury's award probably included certain of these additional components of loss. If the dealer
was unable subsequent to non-renewal to sublet or make use of his business premises,
recovery of the amount he remained obligated to pay under his lease might have been
justified; this amount was not saved as a result of the non-renewal. For the same reason,
perhaps, recovery of the $4,000 loss on parts might have been proper. Whether allowance
of the entire $7,000 loss on equipment would have been proper, however, is open to ques-
tionm It would seem to depend upon whether the dealer, in buying the equipment involved,
justifiably relied upon the continuation, of the franchise for the entire period of amortiza-
tion. See note 89 infra and accompanying text. In no case, however, would recovery of the
$10,000 loss of good will in addition to lost profits have been justified. See 5 Commn;,
CoNTRAcTs §§ 1035-36 (1964).
42. Garvin v. American Motor Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667, 672 (V.D. Pa. 1962),
revid on other grounds, 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963). The court's formulation envisaged
a determination of how long the dealer's franchise would have lasted had the manufacturer
never made coercive demands and had strained relations between it and the dealer never
come about as a result.
The court submitted separate verdict slips to the jury, one for damages sustained dur-
ing the first year following non-renewal and another for damages sustained thereafter.
Appendix to Brief for Appellant, pp. 179a-80a, Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963). It is only with respect to damages for the period following
the first year after non-renewal that the court instructed the jury on such factors as
whether the plaintiff would have wished to stay in business. Id. at 180a-84a. It may be
that the court thought that the plaintiff was minimally entitled to the profits he would have
earned had the manufacturer renewed the franchise for a term, here one year, equivalent
to that which had expired, although it is not clear why this should be the rule.
43. Id. at 181a-82a.
44. Id. at 52a-53a.
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permissible for the jury to infer that the franchise relationship would have
continued in effect until the dealer's death, the jury chose to limit the dealer's
recovery to one year.45
Given the basis of the Garvin formulation - that a dealer is entitled to re-
cover all profits he would have earned but for an unlawful termination or
non-renewal - it might initially seem that the period of recovery ought not
be limited to that during which the particular dealer would have had the desire
and ability to continue in business. Generally, dealerships do not perish upon
the dealer's death or retirement; they are sold to another dealer acceptable to
the manufacturer.48 If, upon death or retirement, the dealer or his estate would
have sold the dealership for a price reflecting its future profit potential, the
sale might be viewed as nothing more than an advance collection of profits
which would have been earned thereafter. And since post- as well as pre-sale
profits are lost as the result of the termination or non-renewal, it is arguable
that the dealer's recovery ought to include the former as well as the latter.
However, it is probable that a dealership cannot be sold for a price reflecting
its profit potential. The dealership is not an asset that can be freely sold: the
manufacturer must agree to issue a franchise to the buyer.47 It appears to be
in the manufacturer's interest to keep the sale price down, 48 and the manufac-
turer may not enfranchise a buyer who pays a price it considers unreasonably
high. Thus the sale price of a dealership may not always reflect its potential
future profits. What the manufacturer often allows is a generous valuation of
the physical assets.49 This "cushion" over the value of the physical assets, while
not equal to the potential profits of the enterprise, is a return from the sale
of the dealership denied to the dealer whose franchise has been wrongfully
terminated. If the amount of this expected "cushion" could be proven, it should
be recoverable, but not as lost profits since it is not dependent upon or related
45. 202 F. Supp. at 672.
46. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 1188.
47. Franchise agreements are not assignable and provide for termination upon any
transfer of ownership in a dealership. See, e.g., FoRD Div., FoRD MOT. Co., FORD SALES
AGREEMENT §§ 17(a) (2), 27 (1962); CHEVRoLET Mor. Div., GENERAL Morons CouP.,
DEALER SELLING AGREE-AENT §§ 18(B) (4) (a-c), 29 (1962).
48. Where the price a buyer proposes to pay would leave him with insufficient capital
to operate efficiently or to weather bad times, the manufacturer's interest in blocking the
sale is obvious. Even where this is not the case, however, the manufacturer's interest is In
minimizing the sale price. Manufacturers, in order to attract good dealers and maintain
good dealer relations, want their dealers to earn a fair return on their capital investment.
49. Manufacturers regard any excess of sale price over tangible asset value as "blue
sky;" it is their general policy not to enfranchise any buyer who proposes to pay a price
reflecting such an excess. Interviews with Richard Leckrone, Assistant Zone Manager,
Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp., Mar. 30, 1964; and Paul Goodman, Presi-
dent, Globe Ford, New Haven, Conn., Mar. 25, 1964. Where the agreed upon sale price
is reasonable considering the profitability of the dealership, however, it seems that the
manufacturer may wink at a somewhat inflated computation. Telephone interview with




to the future profit potentiality of the franchise. The period for which lost
profits are recoverable should thus be limited to the life or work eox-pectancy
of the dealer.50
A serious problem as to the validity of Garvin's definition of the period
during which lost profits are recoverable is suggested by those cases involving
terminations in breach of franchise provisions requiring notice. In such cases,
a dealer will not be heard to argue that had the manufacturer not terminated
until the end of the notice period something would have happened during that
period which would have caused the manufacturer not to terminate at all. The
dealer may recover only the loss he has sustained as a direct result of the
manufacturer's failure to give notice; i.e., his loss of profits during the notice
period. 51 The basic reasoning of the notice cases is that the dealer's remedy
should only be co-extensive with his rights under the contract; since the con-
tracts involved are terminable at will, the courts reason that the dealer is en-
titled only to be given notice, and may only recover for the duration of the
notice period. By parity of reasoning, it might seem that a dealer who has
been terminated or not-renewed in violation of the act should be allowed to
recover only those profits he would have earned before the manufacturer would
have had the right under the act to terminate. 2 The act, as it has been in-
50. It should make no difference that the "dealer" is a corporation. A corporate deal-
er's franchise terminates upon the principal shareholder's death or retirement. See note 47
supra. Although the corporate entity may get a new franchise if its shares rather than its
assets are sold to a buyer acceptable to the manufacturer, the principal shareholder rather
than the corporation should be considered the real party in interest
51. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. McCullough Motor Co., 6 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1925), is
the only case involving an automobile dealership franchise which so held. Authorities in
other areas are dearly supporting, however. See, e.g., Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp,
245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957); In re Petroleum Carriers Co., 121 F. Supp. 520, 525-27
(D. Mmin. 1954); James v. Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co. 196 S.E. 293 (Ga. 1938); Frei-
burger v. Texas Co., 257 N.W. 592 (Wis. 1934).
The basis of the rule is not, it would seem, the unlikelihood that the manufacturer
which has terminated without giving notice would not have terminated at all had it waited.
The basis, rather, is that the dealer has no right against the manufacturer not to be
terminated at the end of the notice period. It is no more relevant that the manufacturer
would not have terminated than it would be in a case involving a buyer's breach of a con-
tract for 100 widgets that but for the breach the buyer would have ordered an additional
100 widgets.
52. The rule limiting recovery of anticipated profits to the notice period (see note 51
supra) does not apply where a manufacturer has terminated in breach of franchise pro-
visions requiring both notice and cause. In such a case, the dealer may recover anticipated
profits for the balance of the stated term of the franchise or, if the term is indefinite, for
a reasonable time. See Note, Contracts - Indefinite Duration of Exclusive Sales Agree-
ments - Distributor's Right to Prospective Profits for a Reasonable Time, 40 N.CL
R-v. 804 (1962). Courts differ, however, where the requirement of cause leaves the manu-
facturer's -discretion substantially unrestricted. Compare Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding,
42 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 872 (1930) (lost profits allowed for one
year where manufacturer could terminate upon 60 days notice "should... any question
arise that threatens to interfere with [a] .. . mutually satisfactory business relationship."
Id. at 444 n.1), with Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912)
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terpreted, does not forbid capricious or arbitrary terminations or non-renew-
als. 3 Unless restricted by the franchise itself, as will often be the case, the
manufacturer has an ongoing right to terminate at any time; the only require-
ment is that the manufacturer not act coercively. Therefore, with respect to
any coercive termination, the manufacturer might argue that it could have
terminated the next instant in perfect conformity with the act and that the
dealer lost no profits as a result of its having terminated sooner rather than
later.
One way to respond to this line of argument, which eliminates lost profits
recovery altogether, is to argue that the existence of the right to terminate is
contingent upon coercion ceasing to be the motive for termination. A manu-
facturer, having attempted to terminate coercively, would not be free of his
coercive motive, and would not acquire the right to terminate lawfully under
the act until he no longer cared to terminate for the coercive reason or until
some new non-coercive reason, itself sufficient to motivate termination, de-
veloped or until the dealer breached a provision of the franchise.54 Since in
many cases it will be likely that the manufacturer will continue to desire termi-
nation for coercive reasons and it will be unlikely that the dealer will breach
the franchise contract or that a sufficient non-coercive reason for termination
will arise, this argument will often lead to a period of recovery equivalent to
that suggested in Garvin -the duration of the franchise under a normal course
of events ending with the death of the dealer or the sale of the franchise.
While this approach, which would limit recovery to that period during which
the act imposed an obligation on the manufacturer not to terminate, seems to
have a greater affinity to traditional concepts of contract damages, it is far
from evident that it would promote the policies of the act to protect dealers
from coercion. Indeed, this approach to damages might well frustrate the
deterrent function of the act by denying all recovery. While severe difficulties
of proof inhere in the Garvin approach, it is suggested that to demand of the
dealer that he prove the manufacturer's future motivations is to impose an
intolerable burden on him.
Nor would shifting the burdens of proof to the manufacturer seem to be
particularly useful. Proof of future motivations with the degree of certainty
required by damage doctrine would still be quite difficult; were a court to
shift the burden to the manufacturer on the issue of a lack of wrongful motive
in the future, the likely failure in proof would allow the dealer to recover for
the same period as in Garvin. But despite the difficulties in proof there seems
(lost profits recovery reversed where manufacturer could terminate upon 60 days notice
if it became "dissatisfied"). See also Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962). Courts
which have allowed recovery in such cases may have thought that it would be unwarranted
to speculate whether the manufacturer would have become "dissatisfied" in the future,
If so, the rationale might carry over to cases arising under the act.
53. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 19 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
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to be no reason to deny the manufacturer a chance to make a showing that
his wrongful motive for termination would have been replaced in the future
by a lawful one.
A second serious problem with the Garvin approach would result from an
application of the certainty doctrine; how could it be determined with any
degree of certainty how long a particular franchise relationship would have
lasted but for an unlawful termination or non-renewal? It should not be as-
sumed, as Garvin implies, that franchise relationships generally, or even often,
endure until a dealer's death or disablement. Nor would it seem enough to
instruct the jury to take into account the possibility that the dealer might, at
some future time, have sold out or otherwise caused the franchise to lapse.
There is the further possibility, ignored in Garvin, that before the dealer ended
the franchise relationship, it would have been lawfully severed by the manu-
facturer. And how could a jury, knowing only the dealer's life expectancy,
predict whether or when any of these things would have occurred?5 Proof
that the dealership would have remained profitable during the period for which
future profits are allowed presents a closely related certainty problem inherent
in the Garvin formulation of damages. ° The volatile nature of the automobile
55. The generally destructive impact of the certainty limitation in such circumstances
is demonstrated by Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.V. 457 (1912),
which involved a five-year automobile dealer franchise terminable upon 60 days notice
should the manufacturer become "dissatisfied." The jury found that the manufacturer was
not "dissatisfied" when it terminated and thus that the termination was wrongful. The
court, while allowing recovery of certain reliance expenses, reversed the jury's award of
profits the dealer would have earned during the balance of the five-year term, holding that
there was no basis for the jury's finding that the manufacturer wouldn't have become
"dissatisfied" before the end of the term. Although recovery of lost profits has sometimes
been allowed in such circumstances (see note 52 supra), this seems to have been due to
the presence on those occasions of substantial reliance expenditures.
56. Whether this factor might in itself preclude recovery of lost profits under the act
has been the subject of considerable controversy. See Kessler, stipra note 5, at 1186, 1188
n.333; Note, 25 GEo. WASH. L. RThv. 667, 684 (1957) ; Comment, 48 CoimMa LQ. 711,
730-32 (1963); Note, 52 Nw. U.L. Rav. 253, 267 (1957); Note, 9 ST='r. L. Rlv. 760,
773-74 (1957).
Where a middleman sues a supplier for loss of resale profits, it is generally required
that he prove the number of sales lost as a result of the supplier's breach, the price at
which these sales would have been consummated, and the cost at which these sales vould
have been made. See Comment, Lost Profits as Contractual Damages: Problems of Proof
and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YAiz L.J. 992, 1005-11 (1956). Prior to the act, con-
tract cases involving terminations of automobile franchises required dealers to prove
damages in this fashion. Because of the uncertainty of proof of this nature in the franchise
context (see Kessler, supra at 1185-86), dealers were sometimes limited to recovery of
profits they would have earned on, the resale of automobiles already ordered by customers
prior to termination. One court refused to go even this far, holding that the dealer %was
bound not only to prove that he had received orders but also that these orders had been
accepted and were legally binding. Busamn Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 104 F.
Supp. 639 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
Predictably, however, Garin adopted the approach taken in Webster Motor Car Co.
v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), reed, 243 F2d 418 (D.C.
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market and the possibility that the manufacturer might enfranchise additional
competing dealers suggest that a showing of continued profitability would be
difficult. Again, application of a rigid certainty rule might substantially pre-
clude recovery of lost profits.
There are, however, compelling considerations which militate against the
application of a strict certainty rule in the proof of lost profits under the act.
In treble damage litigation under the antitrust laws the certainty rule has
been reduced to the status of a best evidence rule.57 Not only does the act
include references to and purport to supplement the antitrust laws,65 but there
is also some evidence in the legislative history that the act may have been in-
tended to liberalize the provisions of section 3 of the Clayton Act.50 Finally,
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), and held that the dealer was entitled to recover
all the profits - whether or not related to sales of new cars - he would have earned dur-
ing the recovery period. It gave no reasons, but its holding was, in this respect, justified,
In the usual middleman-supplier context, consequentially lost profits are unlikely and un-
foreseeable: the middleman generally deals in a number of products and will be able to
find a substitute for that of the supplier in question. In the case of an automobile dealer-
ship, however, termination or non-renewal foreseeably results in loss to the business as a
whole. Importantly, Garvin's approach will, in the ordinary case, enable the dealer to prove
what his profits would have been in the future by showing what they had been in the past.
If the foreseeability limitation is applicable, it might be necessary to make an adjustment
with respect to profits (e.g., profits on sales of automobile collision and liability insurance)
whose loss was unforeseeable. It should seldom be necessary, however, to look to the actual
number of new car sales lost and the profit at which each of these sales would have been
consummated. While the approach greatly facilitates proof of lost profits, however, it does
not obviate the certainty problem entirely. Automobile franchises are not exclusive; manu-
facturer's thus have an ongoing right at any time to franchise competing dealers, As the
profits of an existing dealership would be adversely affected by such an action., this factor,
in conjunction with the volatile nature of the automobile business, makes a projection of
future earnings based upon past earnings unreliable. Cf. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 331,
comment e (1932).
57. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). See also Clark,
The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52
MicH. L. Rav. 363, 391-92 (1954); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirencut and Proof
of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 30 GEo. WASu. L.
REv. 231 (1961).
The more liberal rule is thought to be applicable only in the antitrust context. In-
terestingly, however, the rule has been cited in other contexts. See, e.g., Spitz v. Lesser,
302 N.Y. 490, 494, 99 N.E2d 540, 542 (1951).
58. The preamble to the act states that it is "an act to supplement the antitrust laws
of the United States." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956). There is a further reference to the antitrust
laws in the body of the act. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. In Schnabel v,
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122, 129 (N.D. Iowa 1960), the court rejected
an argument, based upon these references, that the service of process provisions of § 12
of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), were applicable in eases
under the act.
59. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). See Hearings Before the Antitrust




several of the commentators have viewed the act as a functional part of the
antitrust law. 60 It is thus probable that the antitrust liberalization of the cer-
tainty rule will be carried over into litigation under the act. The certainty rule,
moreover, may be undergoing a general relaxation throughout contract law.
In cases involving strong public policy or what may be characterized as immoral
conduct, courts have sometimes weakened the bite of the rule.0' In part this
possible withering of the certainty rule may be viewed as part of the general
movement of contract law away from standardized formulas designed to limit
juries and toward more individualized treatment of particular cases. A new
balance is being formulated in contract cases removing old limitations on jury
discretion and on the amount of recovery, and it would seem anamolous to
maintain a rigid certainty rule as an absolute bar to recovery under the acLca
Finally, if the certainty rule is not relaxed, then recovery for wrongful termi-
nation or non-renewal may be precluded, thwarting the obvious legislative
intent to allow damages and undercutting the protective and preventive fea-
tures of the measure.
63
If a court did accept a best evidence rule in place of a strict certainty require-
ment, a dealer would still have to do more than prove his life expectancy in
order to show how long the franchise would have lasted but for the coercive
termination." Statistics presumably could be compiled, showing the probable
60. See, e.g., Kessler & Stern, supra note 18, at 103-10; licHugh, The Automobile
Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 2 AirrmusT BuL.T 353 (1957).
61. See, e.g., DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pace Corp.
v. Jackson; 284 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1955).
62. The certainty limitation is analogous to the parol evidence rule in that it had its
origin in a long standing and once strong distrust by courts of the jury system. lfcCoi-
ricK, DAs AGEs § 101 (1955) ; Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943).
Although this element continues to find expression in the case law, the limitation's primary
goal may be the same as that of the foreseeability limitation: "to encourage contract-
making by minimizing the consequences of contract-breaking." Patterson, Compulsory
Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 CoLuM. L. R-v. 731, 739 (1943). If true, the rigid
application of the limitation in cases arising under the act would not be justified. It is
unlikely, considering the quasi-tortious nature of conduct proscribed by the act, that a
weakened limitation would discourage the making of franchise agreements. See 5 CoMrn;,
CoNT A cTS § 1008, at 75 (1951). To the extent that it might, however, the harm to
the policy of encouraging contracts would be more than offset by the benefit to the policy
of deterring coercion, and intimidation.
63. While it is true that alternative remedies would be available, each has problems
similar to that of the lost profits remedy. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
64. It is important to remember that the antitrust rule does not relieve a claimant of
his burden of proof - he must still establish a probability that damages in an appro.-
mate amount were sustained. Under the act a dealer must prove how long his franchise
would have remained in effect and the profits he would have earned during that period.
Compare Merager v. Trunbull, 99 P.2d 434 (Wash. 1940), with Noble v. American Three
Color Co., 74 N.Y.S. 764 (Sup. Ct. 1902). If the dealer's profit record affords no reason-
able basis for a projection, either because he has been in business too few years or because
his profits have been unnaturally depressed as a result of the manufacturer's bad faith
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duration of a hypothetical franchise agreement involving a dealer who had
been in business as long as the plaintiff, whose dollar volume was approximately
the same, and whose location was similar.05 The norm thus derived might be
accepted as prima fade the period for which the plaintiff-dealer is entitled to
recover lost profits. It would then be available to the manufacturer to show
that the period would have been shorter by proving, for example, that the
company would soon have gone out of business or discontinued production
of the line of cars the plaintiff was authorized to sell, that the dealer would
not have continued to perform adequately and that this would have caused
the manufacturer to terminate or not renew, or even that the manufacturer
would have cancelled for an arbitrary but uncoercive reason.00
Aside from these evidentiary difficulties, there is the question of whether
the dealer's duty to mitigate damages will place a limit on the amount of re-
covery. Prior to the decision in Garvin, an affirmative answer would have
seemed so clear as not to constitute a problem. In Garvin, however, the court
refused a request by the defendant that it charge the jury as follows:
In computing damages on the basis of net profits that the plaintiff
would have made had his franchise been renewed for an additional year,
you must deduct from such calculation the amount of any earnings that
the plaintiff had during that year from other employment or business or
conduct, he may be able to prove what similar dealerships have been earning. Cl. Fargo
Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d 534, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1953). For
other kinds of evidence which will be relevant in cases under the act, see Webster Motor
Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co. 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd, 243 F.2d 418
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). On proof of lost profits generally, see
Note, The Requirement of Certainty it the Proof of Lost Profits, 64 HAMW, L. rav. 317
(1950).
In the non-antitrust context, the requirement that profitability be proven with reason-
able certainty often precludes recovery for more than one year. See, e.g., Hole v. Unity
Petroleum Corp., 131 P.2d 150 (Wash. 1942). But cf. 5 CoRBNn, CONTRACTS § 1024 (1951).
While it is unlikely that such a restrictive approach will be followed in cases tinder the
act, it is probable that dealers will generally not be able to recover anticipated profits for
the entire period their franchises would have run but for termination or non-renewal.
65. Such an approach was suggested in Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 253, 267 (1957).
Admittedly, the compilation of such statistics would be difficult. One might begin, how-
ever, by looking to past years and determining the average number of years dealers who
were then the plaintiff's age maintained their franchises. The statistics thus derived might
be refined by including in the sample only those dealers whose annual sales and whose
location were similar to plaintiff's. Further refinement, however, might be impractical.
While such factors as a dealer's competence and general health might be extremely rele-
vant, it would obviously be impossible to take these into account in limiting the sample,
For this reason, it is probable that any set of statistics would at best offer only a rough
guide.
66. See text following note 54 supra. An example of a case in which the manufacturer
might be successful in this endeavor would be one in which it proved that it had an estab-
lished policy of retaining no dealer who ever sold less than sixty cars a year and that the
plaintiff-dealer would have been, unable, because of new competition or some other factor,
to continue making this required minimum number of sales.
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any earnings he reasonably would have had if he had diligently sought
or undertaken other employment for which he was suited. 7
Had the court grounded its refusal on the fact, apparently true, that there
was no evidence at trial either that the plaintiff had assets in his business that
had been or could have been converted to other profitable use or that the
plaintiff had secured or might reasonably have secured other profitable em-
ployment,6s its action would have been unobjectionable. Concededly, the bur-
den of introducing such evidence was upon the defendant0 The court, how-
ever, did not base its refusal on this ground. On the contrary, it rejected the
defendant's mitigation argument as "not maintainable under any construction
of the act and . . contrary to the tenor and purpose of the act." T7 If, as it
seems, the court meant that the instruction requested by the defendant would
be improper in any case arising under the act, its reasoning must be disapproved.
The invalidity of Garvin's apparent position in this respect is best shown
by distinguishing two types of claims which will arise under the act: those
for loss of employment earnings and those for loss of investment profits. It
seems clear that traditional mitigation rules should apply to claims for loss of
employment earnings, if such claims are allowed.7 1 By proving that the dealer
67. Appendix to Brief for Appellant% pp. 148a-49a, Garvin v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963). The plaintiff testified that he had been unable to sell
his equipment and that he had had to take his inventory of parts to a scrap heap. Id. at
48a-52a. There seems to have been no other evidence bearing on the question of mitigation.
68. Although it seems unlikely that no such mitigating factors should in fact exist
69. McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) ; Annot.,
134 A.L.R. 242 (1941). Where no evidence on the issue of mitigation has been intro-
duced, refusal of a request to charge on that issue is justified. Barker v. Knickerbocker
Life Ins. Co, 24 Wis. 630 (1869) ; Krawitz v. Ganzke, 114 Conn. 662, 159 AtL 897 (1932)
(dictum).
70. 202 F. Supp. at 673.
71. Whether a dealer would be allowed to recover amounts he would have earned by
devoting his own time and talent to the dealership is open to question. That he would not
is suggested by cases involving construction and non-personal-service contracts where it
is generally held that the reasonable value of services a claimant would have rendered
personally had he completed performance should be deducted from his recovery of lost
profits. Partridge v. Norair Engineering Corp., 301 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Columbus
Mining Co. v. Ross, 218 Ky. 98, 290 S.W. 1052 (1927). Contra Coonis v. City of Spring-
field, 319 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1958); Ryan v. Miller, 153 Ill. 133, 38 N.E. 642 (1894).
Compare Apex Metal Stamping Co. v. Alexander & Sawyer, 48 N.J. Super. 476, 133 A2d
568 (1958). Cases which have adopted this rule strongly imply but may not hold that such
claimants could not sue separately for loss owing to the deprivation of the opportunity
to employ themselves profitably; they may hold only that such loss is not recoverable as
part of the claim for lost profits. Annot., 50 A-L.R. 1397 (1927). Although the rule has
been applied in other contexts, it is generally thought to apply chiefly to construction con-
tracts under which the contractor has full freedom to delegate performance. It seems that
dealers are not allowed to delegate their minimal managerial obligations. See note 73 infra.
Thus, a franchise contract contains elements of a personal service contract While this
may not be dispositive - cf. Partridge v. Norair Engineering Corp., jupra; McMahon
v. Bryant Electric Co., 121 Conn. 397, 185 Ad. 181 (1936)- there are other factors which
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has earned sums in other employments or that he might reasonably have
earned such sums had he sought another suitable occupation and that such
earnings would have been impossible but for the wrongful termination, the
manufacturer establishes that these sums were not lost as a result of its un-
lawful act. It may be difficult, of course, to prove that the actual or hypothetical
earnings in question would have been impossible but for the termination.
Franchise agreements no longer require dealers to work full time managing
the affairs of their dealership.72 Dealers are required, however, to keep them-
selves informed and actively to manage their businesses.78 If the employment
giving rise to the actual or hypothetical earnings in question would have been
inconsistent with this obligation, a deduction should be made. 4 The manu-
facturer might, for example, show that the employment would have been
impossible by demonstrating that had the franchise continued in effect and
had the plaintiff continued to devote the same amount of time to operations
under it and to other established pursuits the number of hours in the day
would have precluded his new employment. 7 The manufacturer might, alter-
serve to differentiate cases arising under the act from those in which the rule hag been
applied. Unlike a building contractor who can devote time freed by breach of other build-
ing contracts, the terminated automobile dealer may be at least temporarily out of a job.
His situation seems more analogous to that of the plaintiffs in Buck v. Mueller, 221 Ore,
271, 351 P.2d 61 (1960), where plaintiff restaurant owner could recover separately the
reasonable value of his services if their loss was foreseeable.
Although Garvin did not specifically discuss this problem, it seems certain that loss of
employment earnings were recovered by the dealer, who combined the functions of sales-
man and serviceman, devoted substantially all his time to the operation of the dealership.
72. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 1143-44.
73. See, e.g., CHEvROLEr MOT. Div., GENERAL MOTORS CoR'., DEALER SELLUNO Auttia-
MENT Third (1962) :
[t]his Agreement is a personal service contract, and is entered into by Chevrolet
with Dealer in reliance upon and in consideration of the personal qualifications of
.. . the following named persons who, it is agreed, will substantially participate
in the ownership of Dealer and/or will actively participate in the operation of
Dealer's Chevrolet dealership ....
It is always required that at least one of the named persons actively participate in the
operation of the dealership. Interview with Richard Leckrone, Assistant Zone Manager,
Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp., in New York City, March 30, 1964.
74. See RESTATEMENT, CoNmRAcrs § 336, comment c (1932); 5 Co"Ixu, CONTRACTS
§ 1041 (1964). Dealers' obligations under franchise agreements vary. They seldom entail,
however, a duty to devote any certain number of hours or any particular hours to the
management of the dealership. For this reason, it may be difficult to prove that earnings
in a subsequent employment would have been inconsistent with the performance by the
dealer of his obligations under his franchise. Cf. Farmers' Fertilizer Co. v. Lillie, 18 F.2d
197 (6th Cir. 1927) ; Ritz v. Music, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 106, 150 A.2d 160 (1959).
75. It is standard doctrine that earnings subsequent to breach which would not have
been inconsistent with performance under the contract are not deductible in mitigation of
damages. See authorities cited in note 74 supra. In discussing the problem of mitigation
in the case of a dealer's claim for loss of employment earnings under the act, however,
analogy to rules devised in the breach of contract context is apt to be misleading. Dealers
generally devote more time to management of their dealerships than is required of them
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natively, show the impossibility of having both jobs by showing that they
were geographically too disparate,70 or that the dealer's new employment was
inconsistent with his duty of loyalty to the manufacturer's product.77
As to claims for lost investment profits, the mitigation issue is more complex.
Generally, some segment of the annual profits of a dealership is attributable
to the dealer's investment. This investment is not totally eliminated by termi-
nation since the dealer's place of business and his office and garage equipment
will still have some value. Presumably this could be put to profitable use or
converted into cash by sale. Where, subsequent to termination, a dealer has
profited by alternative investment of capital assets previously committed to
operations under his franchise, this ought to reduce somewhat his recovery. 8
by their franchise agreements. Since a dealer's claim for loss of employment earnings is
grounded apor the proposition that termination prevented him from using his time to his
greatest advantage, it is the time he did devote to the dealership rather than the time he
was obliged to devote to the dealership which ought to be considered. It is not relevant
that the dealer would have been able to delegate certain of his customary tasks. The
hypothetical allocation of damages between lost earnings and lost profits assumes that the
dealer causes the dealership to "pay" him no more than the reasonable value of his ser-
vices. Theoretically, it is either true that the dealer would have had to pay a delegate a
like amount or that the lesser amount paid to the delegate would have resulted in inferior
management and thus less profit to the dealership.
One should not be confused by the familiar doctrine that one who can delegate per-
formance to others is under no "duty" to mitigate damages. See, e.g., Mt. Pleasant Stable
Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567 (1921) ; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 455, at 373
(1958). That doctrine applies where only the reasonable value of services a claimant would
himself have contributed to performance is included as part of the total cost of perform-
ance and is thus not included in lost profits. See note 71 stpra.
76. Cf. Griffin. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 Pac. 662 (1931);
Martin v. Board of Educ., 120 W. Va. 621, 199 S.E. 887 (1938).
77. It is probable, for example, that a Ford dealer could not become a Chevrolet
dealer in the same city without violating his obligation to Ford to use his best efforts to
promote the sales of Fords. If a dealer is terminated by Ford and subsequently obtains a
franchise from Chevrolet, therefore, it would seem that his earnings as a Chevrolet dealer
ought to be deducted from his recovery against Ford.
78. Where an employee, subsequent to his wrongful discharge, has engaged in a spec-
ulative venture involving an investment of capital as well as labor, earnings from that
venture will, if enabled by the discharge, be deducted in mitigation of damages. Cockburn
v. Trusts & Guarantee Co., 33 D.L.R. 159 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 37 DJ.R. 701
(Can. Sup. Ct 1917); Griffin, v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 Pac.
662 (1931). This rule has been criticized on the basis that were such a venture to result
in a loss, the loss would not increase the employee's recovery. 5 Coini, Coh-rrncrs
§ 1041 (1964) ; cf. Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 19f4)7-. uiioun_ -ti-:
cism would be that, inasmuch as the claimant might have refrained from embarking upon
such a venture and not have had his recovery reduced at all, the rule may tend to en-
courage idleness. The argument that earnings should not be deducted unless they would
have been deducted had the claimant remained idle, however, has traditionally been re-
jected. E.g., Williams v. Robinson, 158 Ark. 327, 250 S.W. 14 (1923) ; see 5 WVIUsTON,
CoirRAcrs § 1359, at 3813 n.3 (rev. ed. 1937). Regardless of the merits of the rule as it
has been applied, it would seem clearly appropriate where, as in the case of an automobile
dealer, performance by the claimant would, have involved a similarly speculative commit-
ment of capital and labor.
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However, the argument will generally be available to the dealer that there
would have been no inconsistency between continuing the franchise and maling
the investment; that he had or could have borrowed sufficient additional funds
to make the investment while leaving his investment in the dealership intact.1 0
Unless, as will not be likely, the manufacturer establishes that the new invest-
ment would have been inconsistent with the franchise or that the dealer had
no credit or additional funds,80 the dealer's recovery should be lessened by
an amount not in excess of the probable cost, over the period for which lost
profits are recoverable, of this hypothetical financing.8 1 The deduction to
which the manufacturer will be entitled, however, should not always be limited
to profits actually made. Where it would have been more profitable for the
dealer to have reduced his assets to cash and to have deposited the resulting
sum in a bank, the deduction should be figured accordingly."- That lesser
79. Earnings derived by an, employee, subsequent to his wrongful discharge, from in-
vestments not enabled by the discharge are not deductible in mitigation of his recovery
against the employer. See, e.g., Ritz v. Music, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 106, 150 A,2d 160
(1959) ; Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 6 F. Supp. 593 (D. Del. 1934). Where
the discharge has freed capital actually used to make the subsequent investment, it is not
clear that a court would hear a claimant to argue that he could have borrowed the money
and made the investment anyway. By analogy to the situation where an employee has
undertaken a new employment not inconsistent with the employment from which he has
been discharged, however, it is probable that the argument would be heard and, If true,
prevail.
80. There would be many instances in which a manufacturer might be able to show
that earnings from a subsequent investment were enabled by the termination or non-
renewal. One would be where the dealer would not have been able, as a financial matter,
to make the investment without the use of assets the retention of which in the dealership
would have been necessary to generate the lost profits he is seeking to recover. To deter-
mine whether the dealer could have financed the new investment notwithstanding the
termination, it would be necessary to determine what free assets the dealer had and what
he could have borrowed. An interesting question would arise where the subsequent invest-
ment involved the use of the dealership's business premises but where this use was not
necessary. Cf. Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1924).
Another instance where the manufacturer might be able to show that termination en-
abled the subsequent investment would be where the making of the investment necessitated
the acquisition of contractual rights which could not have been obtained but for the termi-
nation. It is probable, for e.xample, that Lincoln would not grant a franchise to an appli-
cant already franchised to sell Chevrolets.
A third instance in which a manufacturer might prevail would be where the new in-
vestment necessitated a commitment of time which would have been impossible had the
franchise not been terminated.
Another instance in which a manufacturer might prove that termination enabled the
subsequent investment would be where the making of the investment would have violated
the dealer's franchise obligation to use his best efforts to promote the sale of the manu-
facturer's product. See note 77 supra.
81. Where it would have been cheaper for the dealer to have made the subsequent
investment by liquidating some other investment rather than by obtaining a loan, it Is the
profits he earned on that other investment that ought to be deducted.
82. This conclusion is not free from doubt. Had a terminated Chrysler dealer under-
taken obligations under an Edsel franchise and sustained great losses, it might seem that
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profits were actually earned results not from the termination but from the
dealer's having voluntarily chosen to invest his capital speculatively or poorly.
A similar deduction should be made with respect to a dealer who has not, at
the time of trial, made any alternative investment of his capital.
8 3
Thus far it has been assumed that a lost profits recovery is the only feasible
damage formula applicable under the act. The lost profits measure would,
however, require considerable speculation on the part of the trier of fact. To
avoid these problems with a lost profits measure, Professor Kessler has pro-
posed that the measure of damages be the difference between what the dealer
could have sold his business for before and what he could have sold it for after
termination.s4 The proposed measure, which concentrates upon a paper loss
directly attributable to the wrongful termination, has an advantage in that
proof under it might be more definite. The amount for which the dealership
might have been sold prior to termination might, as Professor Kessler sug-
gests, be determined by capitalizing the dealership's annual earnings at a rate
set with reference to the earnings-sale ratio customarily obtaining in sales
transactions involving similar dealerships.8 5 The amount for which the dealer-
ship might have been sold after termination could be determined by ex.pert
to have deducted from his recovery what he would have earned had he liquidated and
made a riskless investment would have been to add insult to injury.
83. It might be argued that a dealer ought to receive no recovery if, subsequent to
and as a result of the termination, he could have obtained a substitute franchise which
probably would have been just as profitable. In the case of a breach of contract for per-
sonal services, it is the general rule that sums an employee would have been able to make
in a substitute employment for which he was qualified, which was similar in kind and
status to that from which he was discharged, and which would not have required him to
leave the community, should be deducted in mitigation of damages. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AcNcY § 455, comment d (1958). By analogy to this rule, the argument
would seem to have merit. Militating against the argument, however, is the rule that where
an attempt -to recoup or minimize losses would have involved a risk of increasing loss,
a claimant should not be penalized for his failure to make the attempt. See, e.g., 5 CoRInn,
CoTmRAcrs § 1042 (1964); McConmcx, DAMAGES § 35 (1935); RTA EmENT, Colt-
TRAcTs § 336, comment a (1932). Were it assumed that operations under the substitute
franchise would have involved no more than the continuance of a risk the dealer had pre-
viously assumed, the rule might not apply. Cf. William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946); RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcrs § 336, illustration 11
(1932).
84. Kessler, stpra note 5, at 1188-89.
85. For discussions of valuation methods generally and the capitalization method in
particular, see 1 DEwING, FINANCLAL PoLicy oF CoaRoRAToNs 283-349 (4th ed. 1941) ; 1
BoNBRiEHT, THE VALUATION Op PRoPmrrY 233-66 (1937); Duns Review, Mar. 1964, p.
36. As determined by the capitalization method, the market value of a business is that sum
of money which, if invested at the applicable capitalization rate, would yield an amount
representing the business' annual earning capacity. Capitalization rates differ according
to the speculativeness of the business involved. 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra at 335-36. Where
the asset whose market value is sought to be determined has a limited earning life, a more
accurate method of valuation is to calculate the present value of the income expected to
be derived from the asset during its life and to add to this the present value of the sum
which will be received at the end of the asset's life when the asset will be sold as scrap.
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appraisal or by reference to offers actually received by the dealer. A further
advantage of the measure is that in most cases it would obviate the problem
of mitigation of damages which arises under the lost profits approach.
Professor Kessler, in making this proposal, seems to have assumed that
upon sale unterminated dealers generally realize the value of their dealerships
as going concerns. However, as franchise agreements are not assignable and
automatically terminate upon a transfer of ownership, a dealer cannot sell
his dealership as a functioning enterprise unless the manufacturer is willing to
enfranchise the buyer.86 While it is likely that a dealer might be able to sell
his dealership for more prior to than after termination, it is possible that the
differential would not be substantial and that dealers' recoveries under the
proposed measure might be less than under a lost profit formulation. More-
over, since the manufacturer may not exercise his control over the sales price
of dealerships in an even-handed fashion, no certain ratio of sales price to
profits would exist on which to base a capitalization rate. For this reason
the Kessler formulation might, in practice, be confronted with evidentiary
difficulties similar to that of the lost profits approach. While the proposed
measure should be available to dealers as an option, 7 it is doubtful that they
would consistently choose to utilize it unless, because of the certainty require-
ment, the lost profits measure is ruled out as too speculative.
Professor Kessler's proposed measure might be amended to eliminate the
distortion produced by the element of manufacturer control over sale prices.
Thus, a dealer might be allowed the difference between the pre- and post-
termination going concern or enterprise value of his dealership. If amended,
however, the possible advantage of the proposed measure - relative definite-
ness of proof - would be further dissipated. The rate of capitalization appro-
priate to a calculation of pre-termination enterprise value would have to be
determined by conjecture based upon earnings-sale price ratios revealed in
sales of unfranchised businesses which involve what are found to be risks
of similar magnitude. A determination of the risk factor in automobile dealer.
ships would necessarily involve a determination of the likelihood of termina-
tion and the probable duration of the franchise. Proof under the proposed
measure as amended would involve many of the same factual issues and thus
would be no less speculative than the proof required under the lost profits
86. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
87. It is uncertain whether use of the measure would be optional. The measure is
analogous to that often applied where a tort or breach of contract has prevented the ex-
ploitation of a valuable asset and where estimation of profits which have been lost as a
consequence would be speculative. It appears that recovery of the rental value of the asset
during the period its exploitation was prevented is allowed only when a lost profits re-
covery would be barred by the certainty requirement. See REsTATEMraNT, CorRACrs
§ 331(2) (1932); 5 CoMnir, CoNTPAeCrs § 1029 (1964). In the case of a termination of
an automobile franchise, however, the dealer would have had the choice, but for the termi-
nation, either to sell or to remain in business. It would seem, therefore, that lie ought to
have a choice in the matter of alternative remedies.
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measure. And while the measure would obviate calculation of investment
profits prevented and enabled by termination, if lost earnings are recoverable,
it would still be necessary to calculate them separately.88 The suggested amend-
ment, moreover, destroys the theoretical justification of the proposed measure
of damages as it focuses on a loss which was not caused by wrongful termina-
tion. A dealer loses the difference between the going concern and tangible
asset value of his dealership whenever his franchise relation with the manu-
facturer ceases. This loss cannot be avoided by prior sale and thus does not
result from the manufacturer's having wrongfully terminated before he would
otherwise lawfully have terminated or before the dealer would have chosen
to end the franchise relationship on his own accord,
Where the lost profits measure is extraordinarily speculative, it would
sometimes be possible to turn to the reliance measure of damages. But as this
reliance formulation suffers from the very same evidentiary problems as the
lost profits measure, it would not be as attractive an alternative to lost profits
as is generally the case. Assuming that reliance expenditures exist, it will
still have to be determined over how long a period of time in the future the
dealer was justified in relying upon continuation of his franchise. If a new
showroom had just been built at substantial cost with an e.xpected life of thirty
years, could the dealer claim that he relied on the existence of his franchise
for that period of time? What if his life expectancy were only ten years and
if the relevant data showed similarly situated dealers retained their franchises
for an average period of fifteen years?" In any event, as reliance expenditures
will not be present in every case, the formulation provides no comprehensive
solution to the problem of remedy under the act.
The lost profits measure of damages need result neither in the denial of
substantial damages to dealers nor the subjection of manufacturers to the ca-
price of juries. Although relevant evidence will be speculative, it will establish
a basis for approximating the probable loss a dealer has sustained. That this
loss cannot be determined with exactitude should not relieve the manufacturer
from liability for its unlawful act. As the alternative expectation measures also
suffer from similar evidentiary difficulties, they seem to offer the court no
88. See note 71 mpra.
89. For a discussion of the fate of the reliance doctrine in contract cases prior to the
act which involved automobile dealer franchises, see Kessler, m.pra note 5, at 1186-87.
The basic problem with the reliance measure in this context is its lack of an internal
mechanism to produce recoveries reflecting the allocation of risks made by the parties.
Cf. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940). On
reliance damages generally, see Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages, 46 YA.E L.J. 52, 373 (1936) ; Note, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1949).
In some instances in which reliance damages might be appropriate, the dealer may be
able to proceed under the "performing or complying with" provisions of the act and avoid
the problems both of the validity and the applicability of the reliance doctrine. These pro-
visions might be interpreted to allow recovery of any loss sustained by reason of the
dealer's having made an expenditure (e.g., built a showroom) in forced compliance with
a coercive demand by the manufacturer. See note 4 supra.
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realistic means of escape. The lost profits measure is, moreover, particularly
flexible in that it allows a court to submit the issue of damages to the jury
with such limiting instructions as are appropriate in the context of the par-
ticular case and the policy of the act. If courts act reasonably to control the
discretion of juries, recoveries should be sufficiently large to deter bad faith
conduct on the part of manufacturers and sufficiently small to allow manu-
facturers to terminate inefficient dealers without thereby assuming the risk
of having to pay exorbitant damages should they mistakenly be found to have
terminated wrongfully. In certain cases, no doubt, proof will be so speculative
as to render the lost profits approach 'impracticable even under a best evidence
approach to certainty. In many such cases - those, for example, which involve
new dealers with no profit record - reliance damages may still be appropriate.
And since the act has been construed to allow injunctive relief,0 0 where relief
by way of damages is not available 91 dealers will have the opportunity to
utilize this remedy.
90. See note 32 supra.
91. A bill is now before the Senate which would amend the act to make explicit pro-
vision for injunctive relief and to allow dealers threefold damages. S. 2572, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964). It is apparent that the latter aspect of the amendment would not solve the
problem of damages which exists. If punative damages are deemed advisable, it would be
preferable to provide for a minimum recovery of, say, $10,000 which would follow auto.
matically upon proof of wrongful termination or non-renewal. Such an approach was stg-
gested in Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. Rav. 253 (1957).
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